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Abstract
We study if part of the recent international productivity slowdown can be ascribed to intan-
gibles. Over the Great Recession both tangible and intangible investment fell, but intangible
investment fell less and recovered much faster. This might aﬀect measured TFP growth via a
combination of reduced spillovers (if any) from intangibles and mismeasurement of GDP. Using
a 16 country dataset, and proxying intangibles by R&D (for which we have up-to-date data)
we document (a) a slowdown in R&D capital services growth and (b) an increasing diﬀerence
between R&D investment growth and GDP growth that worsens mismeasurement biasing GDP
growth down. We set out a framework showing biases to measured ∆lnTFP from omitted
intangibles, spillovers and capitalisation eﬀects. Estimates suggest a slowdown in ∆lnTFP of
1pppa between 2011-4 and 2000-7, of which declining intangible capital services contributed
0.4pppa and value added mismeasurement 0.2pppa.
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1 Introduction
According to The Conference Board Total Economy Database, between 2000 and 2007, GDP per
hour grew in developed countries1 by 2.0%pa. Between 2011 and 2014 (omitting the Great Recession
years), it grew by 0.6%pa, a slowdown of 1.4ppa. An immediate explanation is a slowdown in inputs.
However, the same data shows a slowdown in TFP growth from 0.6%pa to -0.4% pa, a fall of 1.0pppa.
So some slowdown in inputs can account for the slowdown in labour productivity, but the bulk of
it seems to be a fall in TFP. Understanding this fall in TFP is then the subject of this paper.
A fall in measured TFP growth might be caused by any one of
1. a fall in underlying technical progress
2. a fall in input growth, if such input growth generates spillovers and/or is subject to returns
to scale and/or imperfect competition
3. mismeasurement
Such evidence as we possess does not immediately suggest an answer. Basu and Fernald (1997) ﬁnd
no very clear evidence of returns to scale (or imperfect competition) in US manufacturing. Griliches
(1992) reports evidence for spillovers from R&D, but concludes they were not large enough to
explain much of the 1973 slowdown: Corrado et al. (2013) report some evidence of spillovers from
intangible and labour inputs. Underlying technical progress is very hard to measure and as Syverson
(2013) notes that labour productivity growth proceeded in ﬁts and starts over the 70 years of the
electricity revolution. Mismeasurement, especially of high technology goods and intangibles, seems
a growing problem, but no very clear cross-country story has yet emerged ( Byrne et al. (2015)argue
US oﬃcial measures understate the fall in computer hardware prices in recent years).2
This paper looks at this problem with an emphasis on spillovers, returns to scale and intangi-
bles. Part of our motivation is based on Figure 1 which shows a dramatic slowdown in tangible
investment in 2007-9 (the two dotted lines), but with some recovery. Interestingly, there was a much
more moderate slowdown in intangible investment (the solid line with diamonds is business R&D
spend and the heavy line labeled KBC is investment in knowledge-based or intangible capital
(invesetment in software, R&D, design, branding, training, organisational capital) from Corrado
et al. (2013)).
1 Based on a panel of 16 developed countries covered by the Conference Board Total Economy Database for which we
also have R&D and intangible data, see below. Our countries are Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Czech Republic
(CZE), Denmark (DNK), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Germany (GER), Hungary (HUN) Ireland (IRL), Italy
(ITA), Netherlands NLD), Portugal (PRT), Spain (ESP), Sweden (SWE), United Kingdom (UK) and the United
States (USA). We also have data for Greece and Luxembourg, but dropped them. Greece is a very large outlier
in the later period and Luxembourg GDP is hard to measure due to ﬁnancial services (our regression results are
robust to including Greece).
2 Other cross-country studies, such as ONS (2014) is largely descriptive. Weale (2014) undertakes a cross-country
regression of the labour productivity slowdown on things like Euro membership, size of shock, ﬁnancial and trade
openness, but ﬁnds no clear relationship (Thus the exercise suggests that the depth of the recession and productivity
performance from 2007 to 2010 are still casting a shadow over the OECD economies, but beyond that I have not
been able to identify factors explaining weak productivity growth, p.7). Olivard and Turner's (2014) cross-country
study looks at falls in labour productivity and employment.
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Figure 1: Tangible and Intangible Investment trends
Source: OECD (2015) based on data from www.intan-invest.net. KBC is investment in knowledge
based capital, or intangible capital, namely software, R&D, design, branding, training, organisa-
tional capital.
Further data is set out in Figure 2 which shows changes in (∆lnTFP ) i.e. ∆(∆lnTFP ) between
2000-7 and 2011-4 on the y-axis (so this is mainly negative) and various correlates. As the top left
panel shows, countries with the largest TFP growth slowdown are broadly the UK and Scandinavian
countries, plus Czech Republic and Hungary. These countries had the fastest ∆lnTFP in the initial
period, suggesting some regression to the mean, but not shedding light on why that mean might be
negative. The other panels try to go beyond a time series explanation. As the top right and bottom
left panels shows, there is no particular relation between ∆lnTFP and the size of the 08-09 shock
(measured by the average annual fall in real GDP) or the size of the ﬁnancial sector (measured by
the Domar-Hulten weight of sector J, 2000-07). Finland had a very large negative shock, but a
small ﬁnance weight, and slowed down a lot. Ireland had a massive negative shock and very high
ﬁnance weight, but did not slowdown.
Finally, the bottom right panel shows the biggest slowdown in ∆lnTFP was in countries with
the largest initial intangible investment intensity (investment in software, R&D, design, branding,
training, organisational capital as a share of GDP) e.g. the UK and Scandinavian countries.
So, how might these intangible investment trends help understand the slowdown in measured
∆lnTFP? As above, a slowdown might reﬂect a slowdown in underlying technical progress (this is
discussed in, for example, Gordon (2016), but he is careful to note that much of his projected fall
is due to a fall in human capital). An alternative is that a period of lower intangible investment
(Figure 1) might lower intangible capital service growth (intangibles depreciate quickly and even a
small fall in investment might lead to a fall in intangible capital services growth). We document that
this indeed occurred and it could slow measured ∆lnTFP if such investment is omitted from capital
services or generates externalities. Finally, there might be measurement problems: in particular, if
uncapitalised intangible investment grows faster than GDP, value added (which treats intangibles
as intermediates) is increasingly understated and so measured ∆lnTFP falls. Both these eﬀects are
stronger the more intangibles there are in the economy, which accounts for the faster slowdown in
the more intangible-intensive economies in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: ∆(∆lnTFP ) and lags, shocks, ﬁnance and intangibles
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Source: The Conference Board, Total Economy Database and EU-KLEMS data
We proceed as follows. First, we set out an accounting/theory model that shows the various
biases to measured ∆lnTFP , building on Schankerman (1981). Following, Corrado et al. (2011,
2005, 2009) we assume an upstream ideas or intangible sector, producing new ideas which are
used by the downstream production sector. Like in Romer (1990), the ideas sector has imperfect
competition and so generates mark-ups. The downstream sector uses intangibles, but there might
be spillovers. This model predicts that measured ∆lnTFP equals underlying technical progress
but also the eﬀects of unmeasured intangible inputs, spillovers to existing intangible inputs, plus
various mismeasurement terms (incorrectly speciﬁed shares and value added). Thus a slowdown in
∆lnTFP growth might be due to a slowdown in underlying technical progress, but also to changes
in these various eﬀects.
Second, we explore these eﬀects using a number of data sets. As the ﬁgure shows, we have data
on ∆lnTFP , up to 2014, from the Conference Board. We have data on all intangible investment,
but up to 2011, drawn from the www.intan-invest.net data. We also have more recent data on
R&D, from the OECD. For full growth accounting, we need data on all inputs over all periods, so
that we can correctly calculate outputs, rental shares and inputs. Without this, we develop proxy
measures for the various terms theory suggests aﬀect measured ∆lnTFP by assuming that that the
unavailable post-2011 intangible (a) rental shares are proxied by those earlier and (b) intangible
growth rates are proxied by R&D growth. We then test the relation of these proxy measures to
changes in TFP growth across countries. To anticipate our results, we ﬁnd that falls in TFP growth
are statistically and economically signiﬁcantly correlated (a) with falls in both private and public
4
Figure 3: TFP across 16 countries, 2007=100
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R&D growth, and (b) increased downwards bias to measured GDP due to the failure to capitalise
R&D, both eﬀects interacted with the share of intangibles in the economy. Thus a combination of
omitted intangibles, mismeasurement of GDP and declining spillover eﬀects due to the decline in
intangible capital stocks can explain at least part of the slowdown and why it is stronger in more
intangible-intensive economies.
The rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out the theory, section 3 the data and results
and section 4 concludes.
2 The TFP slowdown
To get some idea of the puzzle we wish to explain, we set out ﬁrst some basic data, drawn from The
Conference Board. Starting with TFP, Figure 3 plots TFP for the countries, indexed to 100 in 2007.
On the top left are countries like the UK, USA, Germany and France, who had reasonable pre-2008
growth, a fall, and then some recovery (the US) or ﬂat lining. On the right are the Scandinavian
countries whose TFP performance since 2008 has seen no recovery at all. On the right are Spain,
Italy and Portugal with declines across the period, and ﬁnally some smaller Eurozone economies,
Austria, Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium, Hungary and Czech Republic with growth before and a ﬂat
or declining performance afterward.
Figure 4 plots growth in TFP in the two periods that we later use in our econometric analysis,
2000-7 and 2011-14 (we miss out the recession years to omit the questions of measuring TFP and
utilization in deep recession periods, for utilization see for example Basu and Fernald (2001)). The
plot also shows that most countries lie to the right of the 45 degree line, so that∆lnTFP has slowed
in almost all countries. So, for example, the countries with the biggest slowdowns are CZE and
FIN who had ∆lnTFP growth in 2000-07 of 2.3%pa and 1.5%pa, but -0.5%pa and -1.2%pa and in
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Figure 4: ∆lnTFP across countries pre- and post-recession
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2011-14. Spain and Ireland had smaller slowdowns and Portugal none, but as we saw above, Spain
and Portugal had negative ∆lnTFP throughout the period.
What might have caused this slowdown? We set out an explicit model below, which involves
spending on all knowledge assets, including R&D, and also various shares: we look just at R&D for
the moment for which we have data to 2013. To get some idea of trends in R&D, consider Figure
5 (to establish notation, the R&D capital stock is denoted XR&D, investment in R&D, Y R&D
and GDP Y V ). The top left panel shows a positive relation between ∆(∆lnTFP ) and changes
in the R&D/GDP ratio,∆(Y R&D/Y V ), so ∆lnTFP slowed more in countries with larger falls in
the R&D/GDP ratio, such as SWE. As the panel shows, however, most countries saw a rise in the
R&D/GDP ratio, bar SWE and the UK. Whilst this is usually taken as an indicator of R&D stance,
it is of course an approximation to what theory suggests drives ∆lnTFP which is ∆lnXR&D or
∆XR&D/Y V (with coeﬃcients that are respectively the output elasticity of R&D capital, and the
rate of return to R&D, see e.g. Griliches (1992))). The top middle and right panels show these
variables and show that in most countries changes in these indicators of R&D stance were negative,
that is to say, the fall in R&D investment in most countries was suﬃcient so that the R&D terms
driving ∆lnTFP fell. This could have slowed down measured ∆lnTFP depending upon the private
and excess returns to R&D (and depending on the relation between these measures and ∆lnTFP :
positive in the top middle right and somewhat negative in the top left (controlling for no other
variables: note that without PRT and ESP the relation is positive). The bottom left panel shows
that in most countries the XR&DGOV /Y
V ratio fell, particularly DNK, HUN, FRA and UK.
The bottom right panel shows captialisation, written as ∆ln(Y V /Y N ). Suppose Y N starts to
grow faster then Y V . Then GDP growth is understated since it is omitting the value added growth
coming from this relatively fast investment growth. If GDP growth is too small then, ceteris paribus,
TFP growth is too small i.e. ∆lnTFP growth appears to slowdown . As the panel shows, for many
6
Figure 5: ∆lnTFP across countries pre- and post-recession
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Table 1: Accelerations data: Changes in growth rates, 2011-14 minus 2000-7
Country TFP R&Dcapital R&Demp AllInputs Captlsn GovR&D
Accel
CZE -2.78% -0.0027 -0.0373 -0.0105 -0.080805 0.00070
FIN -2.74% -0.0726 -0.0405 -0.0075 0.061492 -0.00020
SWE -1.84% -0.0396 0.0607 0.0008 -0.020234 0.00002
HUN -1.63% 0.0075 0.0127 -0.0067 -0.042905 -0.00064
NLD -1.23% 0.0256 0.0943 -0.0098 -0.114865 -0.00002
UK -1.23% -0.008 -0.0478 -0.0005 -0.017543 -0.00038
AUT -1.07% -0.0315 -0.0279 -0.0015 0.019194 0.00014
BEL -0.94% 0.014 0.0048 -0.0051 -0.052613 0.00055
DNK -0.93% -0.0444 -0.029 -0.0068 0.025157 -0.00117
GER -0.85% 0.0007 0.0148 0.0067 -0.009226 0.00081
FRA -0.66% 0.0033 -0.0121 -0.0066 -0.0217 -0.00055
USA -0.52% -0.0118 0.0068 0.0002 -0.013443 0.00014
ITA -0.14% 0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0242 0.014049 -0.00005
PRT -0.03% -0.1073 -0.0586 -0.0288 0.193809 -0.00040
Count neg 14 8 8 11 9 8
Average, DDlnTFP<0 -1.19% -1.90% -0.43% -0.72% -0.43% -0.01%
Average, DDlnTFP<0 (excl PRT) -1.27% -1.23% -0.01% -0.55% -1.95% 0.00%
IRL 0.18% -0.0147 -0.0076 -0.0373 -0.018664 -0.00014
ESP 0.45% -0.0708 -0.1157 -0.0477 0.074096 0.00074
Accel, share-weighted
Average, DDlnTFP<0 -1.19% -0.13% 0.00% 0.05% -0.10% -0.007%
Average, DDlnTFP<0 (excl PRT) -1.27% -0.09% 0.03% 0.04% -0.19% -0.005%
Notes: all columns are changes in growth rates of titled variable (except the ﬁnal column). Countries are ranked
by their change in ∆lnTFP in column 1. R&D Capital and R&Demp are the changes in the growth rates of
R&D capital and employment respectively. Captlsn growth is change in (∆lnY V −∆lnY R&D). AllInputs is the
change in the growth rate of all measured capital and labour service inputs. GovR&D is the change in the ratio of
government spend on R&D to GDP (that is, a change in the ratio, not a change in growth rate of ratio). Count neg
is a count of the number of countries with negative ﬁgures in the upper panel (the maximum is the 14 countries in
column 1 with a ∆(∆lnTFP ) < 0. The lower panel shows averages of the upper panel terms, weighted by intangible
shares of non-software intangibles (columns 2, 3 and 5) and all intangibles (column 4), see text.
Source: Conference Board, Total Economy Database and OECD iLibrary
countries, this capitalisation eﬀect has changed negatively, so that measured ∆lnTFP should slow.3
To see these last points more clearly, Table 1 sets out some accelerations in the raw data. Each
column shows changes in the growth rates of the variables concerned, changes being between 2000-
07 and 2011-14, ranked by changes in ∆lnTFP in column 1 (so CZE, FIN and SWE are at the top
with the highest falls). Column 2 shows the change in R&D capital growth that we plotted in Figure
5: it has fallen in 8 out of the 14 countries that have had a fall in ∆lnTFP (see the count neg
row), thus potentially accounting for some of that ∆lnTFP change: the falls in SWE and FIN are
noticeable. Column 3 shows a fall in 8 out of the 14 countries in R&D employment growth as well.
3 All these terms in the above two paragraphs are of course related, but not quite the same. The change in the R&D
spend to GDP ratio is ∆[Y R&D/Y V ]. The change in the change in R&D capital to GDP ratio is ∆[∆XR&D)/Y V ],
which using the perpetual inventory model we can write as ∆[(Y R&D− δXR&D)/Y V ]). The change in the capitali-
sation term is ∆[∆ln(Y V /Y R&D)]. So these terms diﬀer referring to changes in: Y R&D, Y R&D net of depreciation,
and changes in lnY R&D.
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Column 5 (we explain column 4 later) shows a fall in 9 countries of the growth in the capitalisation
term, (∆lnY V −∆lnY R&D) between the periods. Finally, column 6 shows a slowdown in the ratio
of government R&D spend to GDP in eight countries. The rest of the columns are discussed below.
3 Framework
3.1 Theory
There are potentially many explanations of the productivity slowdown, but to keep the focus here
on the diﬀerential behaviour of intangible investment, we set out a model that tries to isolate the
impact of intangibles on TFP growth via possible spillovers, imperfect competition and input and
output mismeasurement. Despite having an intangible focus, we hope the model is of more general
interest. The two-sector model is a slight extension of Schankerman (1981) and builds on Corrado
et al. (2005, 2009) and Corrado et al. (2011) and the output elasticities/imperfect competition
approach draws on Basu et al. (2006).
Technology: upstream knowledge sector. The intangible sector produces new knowledge N rent-
ing inputs i which are labour, L, tangible capital, K with output price PN and rental prices PL, PK ,
stocks denoted Xi and output elasticities ε. The production function is
dlnY N =
∑
iK,L
εXNi
dlnXNi + dlnA
N (1)
The knowledge sector is assumed to produce knowledge on the basis of its labor and capital,
and we assume that it gets knowledge for free (this for simplicity, say from the public sector).
Technology: downstream. The consumption sector produces ﬁnal consumption goods by renting
labour, capital and intangible capital, the stock of the latter is denoted XCR
4as follows
dlnY C =
∑
iK,L
εXCi
dlnXCi +
∑
iR
εXCi
dlnXCi + dlnA
C (2)
Accounting: GDP. In this economy, GDP is deﬁned as,
dlnY Q ≡ sNQdlnY N + sCQdlnY C
dlnY Q ≡ dlnY C + sNQ (dlnY N − dlnY C)
(3)
where the second line follows since sNQ + s
C
Q = 1 (since s
N
Q ≡ PNN/PQQ where PQQ = PNN +
PCC). As a slight aside, it will be helpful in what follows to record that we may write dlnY Q in
terms of the inputs in both sectors , namely
4 The relation between the stock of knowledge rented by the downstream sector and the output of new knowledge
by the upstream sector is from a perpetual inventory model ∆XCR = Y
N − δXCR,t−1.
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dlnY Q = sNQ
∑
iK,L
εXNi
dlnXNi + s
C
Q
∑
iK,L,R
εXCi
dlnXCi + s
N
QdlnA
N + sCQdlnA
C (4)
or in terms of the inputs in the downstream sector only and the relative outputs of the two
sectors
dlnY Q =
∑
iK,L,R
εXCi
dlnXCi + dlnA
C + sNQ (dlnY
N − dlnY C) (5)
Optimizing behaviour. The above are technology and accounting relations. We now assume
optimising behaviour by ﬁrms. In the downstream sector, we assume competitive product and
factor markets so that εXCi
can be written
εXCi
= s
XCi
C , i = K,L; s
XCi
C = P
C
XCi
XCi /P
CY C (6)
We do however assume there might be spillovers to knowledge, which we capture5 as γ
εXCi
= s
XCi
C (1 + γ) , i = R; s
XCi
C = P
C
XCi
XCi /P
CY C (7)
In the upstream sector we assume it earns a markup on knowledge production following Romer
(1990)6
εXNi
= µs
XNi
N , , i = K,L; s
XCi
N = P
N
XCi
XNi /P
NY N (8)
Technical progress. We deﬁne underlying technical change in this economy as
dlnA ≡ sNQdlnAN + sCQdlnAC (9)
Thus we may write down outputs, inputs and dlnA in this economy in terms of the sectors as
dlnY Q = sNQµ
(
s
XNL
N dlnX
N
L + s
XNK
N dlnX
N
K
)
+ sCQ
(
s
XCL
C dlnX
C
L + s
XCK
C dlnX
C
K + (1 + γ)s
XCR
Q dlnX
C
R
)
+dlnA (10)
where sNQ and s
C
Qare the shares in Q of the two sector outputs; or equivalently in terms of the
factor inputs as
5 This functional form assumes spillovers in sector C to be proportional to the intangible factor share in that sector.
6 Note that a mark-up implies increasing returns in the upstream sector, see Basu et al. (2006) of degree ρ =µ(1 −
spi) where pi is the share of pure proﬁts in value added. Thus we speak of mark-ups and increasing returns
interchangeably. Basu et al. (2006) ﬁnd spi to be very low in their US manufacturing industry data and thereby
argue that returns are near constant and mark-ups unity (ρ = µ = 1).
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dlnY Q = sXLQ
(
µs
XNL
L dlnX
N
L + s
XNL
L dlnX
C
L
)
+ sXKQ
(
s
XNK
K dlnX
N
K + s
XCK
K dlnX
C
K
)
+ (1 + γ) sXRQ dlnX
C
R
+dlnA (11)
where sXLQ and s
XK
Q and s
XR
Q are the shares in Q of the three factor rental payments. If we then
write dlnTFP as GDP less GDP-weighted shares of all inputs (note all inputs means K, L and N
inputs, valued at their factor shares) we have, where i refers to inputs and J to sector:
dlnTFP =dlnY Q −
∑
iK,L,R
JN,C
s
XJi
Q dlnX
J
i
=dlnA+ γi
(
s
XCR
Q dlnX
C
R
)
+ (µ− 1)
(
s
XNL
Q dlnX
N
L + s
XNK
Q dlnX
N
K
)
(12)
that is, TFP growth is underlying technical change,dlnA, plus plus spillovers to knowledge dlnXR,
plus upstream inputs, which in TFP are wrongly counted as share-weighted, whereas they should
have been calculated at µ times their share. Thus if γ = 0, µ = 1, then dlnTFP = dlnA. We
remark on the diﬀerences between this and Schankerman (1981) below.
3.2 Measurement with no intangibles capitalised
As a matter of measurement, TFP is calculated capitalising some intangibles (in the TCB data,
software for example, but not R&D). We deal with this case below, but to show the intuition
and ease notation, let us suppose that no intangibles are capitalised in which case measured TFP,
denoted ∆lnTFPM is then measured output less share-weighted Kand L (but not N) inputs,
∆lnTFPM = ∆lnY C −
∑
iK,L
JN,C
s
XJi
C ∆lnX
J
i (13)
Notice that in comparison with the top line of (12) ∆lnTFPM (a) uses the wrong output Y C
and (b) the wrong inputs, since they are (i) shares of C not Q and (ii) include upstream inputs K
and L even though we are excluding upstream outputs in value added and (iii) excludes N inputs.
This means that measured ∆lnTFP is
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∆lnTFPM = dlnA
+ (1 + γ)
(
s
XCR
Q dlnX
C
R
)
+ (µ− 1)
(
s
XNL
Q dlnX
N
L + s
XNK
Q dlnX
N
K
)
(14)
+
(
PCC
PQQ
− 1
) ∑
iK,L
JN,C
s
XJi
C ∆lnX
J
i
+ sNQ (∆lnY
C −∆lnY N )
What then might have caused measured TFP growth, ∆lnTFPC to slowdown? The ﬁrst term,
∆lnA is underlying technical progress, so ∆lnTFPC slows down if this slows down. Second, the
(1+γi)
(
s
XCR
Q dlnX
C
R
)
term is the rental-share weighted growth in intangible inputs: if uncapitalised,
they will not be counted as an input and so drive ∆lnTFPC to the extent of their rental share plus
any spillovers (hence the (1 + γi)).
Third, the (µ− 1)
(
s
XNL
Q dlnX
N
L + s
XNK
Q dlnX
N
K
)
term appears since K and L inputs to N -sector
production are valued at their factor shares, instead of µtimes their factor shares. Fourth, the
(PCC/PQQ− 1)∑iK,L,N,JN,C sXJiC ∆lnXJi term arises because the shares of the measured inputs,
K and L are miscalculated in conventional TFP as shares of C instead of Q.
Finally, the sNQ (∆lnY
C − ∆lnY N ) captures the fact that value added is miscalculated since
uncapitalised intangibles should contribute to value added, compare C and Q in (3).
In the light of (14) can we explain the slowdown? One possibility is that dlnA might have slowed
down. Second, as we have seen in Figure 1 shows that there was a slowdown in R&D investment,
suggesting a possible slowdown (a) in the output of R&D used by the downstream sector, ∆lnXN
(second line of (14) ) and (b) the inputs to the R&D sector (third line of (14) ). This slows down
∆lnTFPC if there are spillovers and/or imperfect competition in the N-producing sector. Third,
Figure 1 also shows that the tangible investment fall was faster than the R&D investment fall. If this
implies that value added growth fell by more than intangible, it might be that (∆lnY V < ∆lnY N )
and so, via the ﬁnal capitalisation term, ∆lnTFP V slows down.
Finally, the second to last term in (14) shows that if the K and L inputs are growing, then
measured ∆lnTFPC is too small. Why? The K and L inputs are calculated as shares of C, but
should be shares of Q. Since Q is larger than C, the shares of C are too large and hence measured
∆lnTFP is too small. Thus if Σs
XJi
C ∆lnX
J
i rises, ∆lnTFP
C would fall, which would explain the
slowdown (although note as a matter of data that Σs
XJi
C ∆lnX
J
i has fallen, so this would tend to
speed up measured∆lnTFPC .
Note ﬁnally, that apart from the penultimate term, a given slowdown in ∆lnXCi will slow
∆lnTFP V by more in economies where the intangible shares are large, which is supported by the
right panel of ﬁgure (2).
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3.3 Measurement with some intangibles capitalised
When some intangibles are capitalised, we have a very slightly diﬀerent expression. Denote the
output of included capitalised intangibles as N ′ so measured value added is
∆lnY V = (sN
′
V ∆lnY
N ′ + sCV∆lnY
C) (15)
where the shares are of P V V = PN
′
N ′ + PCC. Hence true output, Q is
∆lnQ = (sN+Q ∆lnY
N+ + sVQ∆lnY
V ) (16)
where the shares are of PQQ = PN+N++P V V where N+ are the uncapitalised intangibles. So,
measured TFP, denoted ∆lnTFP V is then measured output less share-weighted included inputs,
where R′ is the stock of capitalised intangibles
∆lnTFP V = ∆lnY V −
∑
iK,L,R′
JN,C
s
XJi
V ∆lnX
J
i (17)
where note that we measure TFP by subtracting oﬀ measured intangibles, weighted by their
competitive factor share. However, like (16) this measure uses the wrong output (V not q), weights
inputs by V and not Q and misses out some uncapitalised intangibles N+. This means that measured
TFP is
∆lnTFP V = dlnA
+ (1 + γ)s
XCR+
Q dlnX
C
R+
+ γs
XC
R′
Q dlnX
C
R′
+ (µ− 1)
∑
iK,L
(
s
XNL
Q dlnX
N
L + s
XNK
Q dlnX
N
K
)
(18)
+
(
P V V
PQQ
− 1
) ∑
iK,L,R′
JN,V
s
XJi
V ∆lnX
J
i
+ sN
+
Q (∆lnY
V −∆lnY N+)
which diﬀers slightly from (14). The ﬁrst term shows the eﬀect on measured ∆lnTFP of
omitted new intangibles (their share and spillovers), and the second the spillover eﬀect, if any, from
currently included intangibles. The third term is as before and the fourth refers to all measured
inputs, previously K and L and now K, Land N ′, multiplied by the share adjustment required.
The ﬁnal term is a value added mismeasured due to omitted intangibles, here N+.
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3.4 Relation to Schankerman (1981)
Schankerman (1981) has a one sector model with no spillovers or imperfect competition. Thus we
may write down outputs, inputs and dlnA in this economy in terms of the sectors as
dlnY N =
(
s
XNL
N dlnX
N
L + s
XNK
N dlnX
N
K
)
+ dlnAN (19)
dlnY C =
(
s
XCL
C dlnX
C
L + s
XCK
C dlnX
C
K + s
XCN
C dlnX
C
N
)
+ dlnAC (20)
He identiﬁes two drivers of ∆lnTFP from measurement. First, mismeasurement of value added,
which gives the same term as. Second, Schankerman (1981) deﬁnes his TFP measure as all output
(dlnY Q) less share-weighed downstream K and L, that is, not subtracting upstream K and L. Thus
his mismeasurement driver comes from the assumption that measured K and L input quantities and
measured shares includes upstream K and L.
Looking at (20), if one has only downstream output data (say company accounts, with R&D
not capitalised), subtracting oﬀ the non-R&D L and K has a straightforward interpretation: it
identiﬁes knowledge input plus downstream TFP. Now, that downstream knowledge input is up-
stream knowledge output. That upstream output in turn might be due to upstream TFP, but also
to upstream labour and capital growth. So, if for example, the knowledge sector is using more
computers, then the approach of just subtracting oﬀ downstream K and L will ascribe some of the
resulting knowledge growth to the use of more capital (in this case upstream).
With data on all outputs, (19) and (20) indicate that subtracting oﬀ just downstream K and L
makes measured TFP equal to share-weighted upstream K and L and share-weighted downstream
knowledge payments. Our approach above subtracts oﬀ the upstream K and L, to try to capture
upstream dlnAN (see (19) ) and also downstream factor payments to try to capture dlnAC(see (20)
). Thus our bias term arises since all factors are evaluated at their wrong shares, not just the
downstream factors.7
7 One might think that subtracting oﬀ both upstream K and L and also downstream N is double subtracting i.e.
subtracting oﬀ the both scientists and also the knowledge they produce. Of course the same logic would indicate
that conventional TFP is wrong since one subtracts oﬀ both workers in the capital-producing industries and the
capital they produce. (19) and (20) give some insight into why there is no double counting. First, we assume
that knowledge itself is produced using K and L e.g. computers and so if one subtracts oﬀ K downstream it seems
consistent to subtract K upstream. Second, it is not correct that payments for downstream knowledge are captured
by wages to upstream scientists. As the equations indicate, scientists and capital in the knowledge-producing sector
produce a capital asset, with value Y N , which is then rented to the knowledge-using sector for a price PXN (think
say of a patent asset, the use of which generates annual licence payments . If the scientists were able to capture
all the value upstream, then Y N would equal the labour costs of scientists and if the asset lasted one year, then
the licence payment equal Y N . Hence all knowledge payments would be captured by scientists and one would only
want to subtract from output payments to non-scientists.
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4 The transition to econometric work
4.1 From theory to model
If we had full data we could evaluate every term in (18). However, we do not. So we are forced to
develop proxies for the various terms in (18) and therefore study not an accounting decomposition
but whether trends in the proxies are correlated with ∆lnTFP. In detail, from TCB we have a panel
of value added, capital and labour inputs and TFP up to 2014 for number of countries. We do not
have intangible data, integrated into national accounts, up to 2014 (note that the incorporation of
intangibles requires changes in outputs, capital costs and inputs and so is not a small task). We do
however have (business sector) R&D investment up to 2013 from the OECD, and since these data
go back to 1980, we can use a perpetual inventory model to build up R&D capital stocks. Thus
for the shares, we use data for all intangibles from 2000-2007 (nominal investment in intangibles as
a proportion of new intangible-adjusted GDP) and to proxy intangible investment and intangible
capital stocks, we use the R&D data.8
Proceeding term by term on the right of (18), we proxy the ﬁrst and second share-weighted R&D
capital stock growth. The third term, intangible share-weighted growth in inputs in the N sector,
we do not have, but we do have R&D employment and so proxy this by share-weighted growth in
R&D employment.
Turning to the corrected share terms, we used the TCB capital and labour shares for sVX and
the intan-invest shares for sQX . As a matter of data, s
Q
XL
< sVXL for labour, but s
Q
XK
> sVXK for
capital (payments to capital rise when we capitalise them and by more than GDP rises, so capital
payments are greater as a share of PqQ. Since ∆lnK > ∆lnL then the share adjustment term is
negative. For the capitalisation term we use growth in TCB measured value added less growth in
R&D spend, all multiplied by the share in PqQ of uncapitalised intangibles.9 With these proxies
we estimate a model for measured ∆lnTFP for country c at time t
8 We use data for business spending on R&D since this is more amenable to building R&D capital stocks, XR&D (we
do not know deprecation rates for public sector R&D).
9 There is a complication around value added. Since the TCB data is based on national accounts, it includes R&D in
value added (to the extent that the statistical agencies have capitalised R&D which agencies are doing at various
rates). However, their TFP models do not include R&D as a capital input. That said, even though measured value
added has R&D in it, we are using changes in the R&D/value added ratio as a proxy for the omitted capitalisation
eﬀects that we think are occurring from the full range of intangibles that R&D proxies for.
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∆lnTFPMEASc,t = β1
(
sN+Q ∆lnXR&D
)
c,t
+ β2
(
sNQ∆lnLR&D
)
c,t
+ β3
(−sN+Q ) ∑
iK,L,R′;JN,V
s
XJi
V ∆lnX
J
i

c,t
(21)
+ β4
(
sN
+
Q (∆lnY
V −∆lnY R&D)
)
c,t
+ β5
(
(Y R&D,Gov/Y V
)
c,t
+ λc + λt + vct
where we have added a ﬁfth term, Government R&D as a proportion of GDP, to capture any
general spillovers to R&D from publicly-available R&D in that country (recall that we assume that
the upstream sector gets its information for free, from government, universities etc., any other
freely-available information we relegate to time dummies). We also add country and time dummies
and an iid error term.
4.2 TFP growth and its correlates
Before turning to regressions 6 show graphs of ∆lnTFP and its suggested correlates from (21).
Figure . Each panel shows ∆lnTFP against the terms on the right hand side of (21). We take
averages 2000-07 and 2011-14 and so each country appears twice. All panels show what theory
predicts. In the top two, countries with higher ∆lnTFP in each period also had higher share-
weighted R&D capital growth, sN+Q ∆lnXR&D and R&D labour growth, s
N
Q ∆lnLR&D. There is
a negative relation with the share-adjusted input terms, as theory predicts, and a positive relation,
see the bottom row, between the capitalisation and public R&D terms.
5 Estimates and accounting for slowdown
5.1 Estimates
To estimate (21), we have available a panel of 16 countries. Year-by-year changes are likely to be
dominated by noise and we do not want to obscure the picture with cyclical factors, so we formed
a panel of averages 2000-07 and 2011-2014 i.e. 16 countries and two periods. We estimate (21) by
random eﬀects, to accommodate the panel nature of the data (the data rejected the joint-signiﬁcance
of ﬁxed eﬀects), and insert a constant and time dummy for the second period, whose interpretation
is then post-Great Recession fall in ∆lnTFP common to all countries controlling for other factors.
Long averages removes noise, and enables us to better see the data (see ??), but reduces sample
size: below we show very similar results with a four period panel of shorter year spans.
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Figure 6: ∆lnTFP and regressors in (21)
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Source: Conference Board, Total Economy Database and OECD iLibrary
Note: Data are averages 2000-07 and 2011-14 and so each country appears twice
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Table 2: Regression results
(estimates of (21): dependent variable ∆lnTFP )
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES ∆lnTFP ∆lnTFP ∆lnTFP
(4 Xsect)
(Y R&D,Priv/Y V ) 0.38
(2.18)
sQXN+
∆lnXR&D 2.88 1.98
(3.38) (2.04)
sQXN∆lnLR&D 1.22 1.11
(3.01) (3.22)∑
iK,L,N ′(s
Q
V − 1)∆lnXi 1.01 1.46
(0.56) (1.05)
sN
+
Q (∆lnY
V −∆lnY R&D) 2.55 2.18
(4.47) (3.72)
(Y R&D,GOV /Y V ) 2.78 2.05
(2.51) (1.82)
time dummy×100, 2011-14 -1.06 -0.43 -0.93
(-4.98) (-1.88) (-2.57)
R2 0.45 0.65 0.49
Notes to table. Equation includes constant and time dummy. Estimation by random eﬀects, 16 countries, two
cross-sections (2000-07 and 2011-14; except column 3 which has 4 cross-sections (1997-00, 2001-03, 2004-07, 2011-14)
and three time dummies: only the 2011-4 time dummy reported.
Table 2 sets out our estimates of (21). To ﬁx ideas, column 1 presents a classic regression of
∆lnTFP on the private R&D/GDP ratio (Y R&D,Priv/Y V ) and obtains a rate of return of 38%,
very similar to other studies. Note that the time dummy suggests a common slowdown of 1.06ppa.
in 2011-14, relative to the 2000-7 period, which is very considerable. The next column enters all
variables from 21 and ﬁnds them all statistically signiﬁcant, except the share-adjusted term. Notice
that now the time dummy suggests a common slowdown of 0.44pppa. As a check, in the ﬁnal column
we form a new panel with 4 cross-sections of three-year spans: the signiﬁcance and magnitude is not
much aﬀected. We also ran regressions including the shock and ﬁnancial terms graphed in Figure 2
plus the labour productivity gap with the USA: none of these terms aﬀected the variables in Table
2, nor were these additional variables signiﬁcant.
5.2 Accounting for the slowdown
How much does our results account for the fall in ∆lnTFP? Table 3 sets out, for each country,
contributions of each eﬀect, that is the co-eﬃcient times the change in the regressor.
The ﬁnal column is the sum of the column contributions. The table is ordered by the countries
with the highest falls (most negative) ∆(∆lnTFP ). Take for example Finland, which had a fall
in ∆lnTFP of 2.74pppa. As table shows, the intangible/spillover eﬀect predicts a fall in ∆lnTFP
of 1.7pppa as does the number of R&D employees (0.5pppa) (i.e. those regressors all fell and the
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Table 3: Predicted ∆(∆lnTFP ): (based on regression coeﬃcients from Table 2, column 6, and data
from Table 1 times share)
Country TFP R&Dcapital R&Demp ShareAdj Captlsn GovR&D Sum
CZE -2.78% -0.00026 -0.00448 0.0008 -0.01573 0.00194 -1.77%
FIN -2.74% -0.01733 -0.00527 0.00051 0.01432 -0.00055 -0.83%
SWE -1.84% -0.01255 0.01026 -0.00007 -0.00505 0.00006 -0.74%
HUN -1.63% 0.00389 0.00203 0.00048 -0.0117 -0.00177 -0.71%
NLD -1.23% 0.00648 0.0125 0.00089 -0.02615 -0.00006 -0.63%
UK -1.23% -0.00255 -0.00747 0.00015 -0.00438 -0.00107 -1.53%
AUT -1.07% -0.00653 -0.00292 0.00009 0.0035 0.0004 -0.55%
BEL -0.94% 0.00585 0.00129 0.00023 -0.01464 0.00154 -0.57%
DNK -0.93% -0.01092 -0.00353 0.00057 0.00561 -0.00324 -1.15%
GER -0.85% 0.00028 0.00184 -0.00058 -0.00198 0.00226 0.18%
FRA -0.66% 0.0018 -0.00111 0.0005 -0.00566 -0.00153 -0.60%
USA -0.53% -0.00379 0.00152 -0.00008 -0.004 0.0004 -0.60%
ITA -0.14% 0.0001 -0.00004 0.00137 0.00215 -0.00013 0.35%
PRT -0.03% -0.01714 -0.00508 0.00163 0.0286 -0.00111 0.69%
Average if DDlnTFP<0 -1.19% -0.38% 0.00% 0.05% -0.25% -0.02%
Average if DDlnTFP<0, excl PRT -1.27% -0.27% 0.04% 0.04% -0.49% -0.01%
IRL 0.18% -0.00015 0.00068 0.00193 -0.00308 -0.00038 -0.10%
ESP 0.45% -0.00921 -0.00886 0.00222 0.00901 0.00205 -0.48%
All country average -1.00% -0.39% -0.05% 0.07% -0.18% -0.01%
Source: Coeﬃcients from Table 2, second ﬁnal column, times data from 1 times shares. Sum is the row sum across
columns 2-6.
coeﬃcients on them are positive). The share-adjustment term also predicts a (very small) rise of
0.05pppa. By contrast, the capitalisation eﬀect goes (strongly) the wrong way, that is to say, that
capitalisation would have predicted a rise in ∆lnTFP : recall from Table (1) that FIN saw a rise
in capitalisation, which would have therefore raised measured ∆lnTFP . Finally, public R&D fell,
which contributed (a tiny) 0.02pppa. Thus overall, see last column, the eﬀects predict a fall in
∆lnTFP of 0.8pppa, that is 30% of the total fall of -2.74pppa.
Consider the large slowdown countries we identiﬁed earlier, FIN, SWE and the UK. FIN and
SWE have particularly large eﬀects from R&D inputs, whereas the UK has uniformly negative
eﬀects from R&D inputs, capitalisation and government R&D.
Turning to the small slowdown countries, ITA, PRT and ESP, they all have positive capitalisation
eﬀects i.e. they have not had a rise in the R&D/GDP ratio and so their mismeasurement due to
uncapitalised R&D is smaller. Finally, the USA and GER are interesting: their public sector R&D
has helped boost TFP growth, likewise they have had a rise in R&D employment.
The ﬁnal two rows of the upper panel give some averages of all countries with a slowdown and
all excluding Portugal (PRT): PRT has a large R&D capital and capitalisation eﬀect. The very ﬁnal
row is an average over all countries. Looking at that row, and moving term-by-term, the average
eﬀect of the slowdown in R&D capital is around 0.4pppa. That is to say, since the recession there
has been a slowdown in R&D investment and hence of R&D capital growth and if this is a proxy for
a fall in general intangible growth, we would have a fall in measured TFP of about 0.4ppa (where
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the TFP eﬀect arises from unmeasured intangibles and spillovers to existing intangibles).
The inﬂuence of R&D employment is quantitatively small, about 0.05pppa. The share adjust-
ment term predicts a (small) speedup of 0.07pppa. That is to say, growth in measured inputs has
slowed, which should have raised measured ∆lnTFP (since with slower input growth, the TFP is
less overstated). The capitalisation terms are around -0.2pppa, i.e. the mismeasurement of ∆lnTFP
has got worse thus slowing down measured ∆lnTFP . Finally, government R&D has declined since
the crisis, but the eﬀect on slowing ∆lnTFP is rather small, -0.01pppa.
What do we learn from this exercise? First, the slowdown in intangible capital predicts a
slowdown of 0.4pppa, and the increased capitalisation bias a slowdown of 0.2ppa, with other eﬀects
small. These sum to 60% of the actual slowdown of 1ppa. Second, in terms of overall performance,
the exercise ﬁts the extent of the slowdown reasonably well: the correlation between the actual
slowdown and predicted slowdown (column TFP and Sum in (3)) is 0.65. Finally, the time dummy
for the second period suggests, controlling for other things, a slowdown in ∆lnTFP of 0.4pppa (see
Table (2)).
6 Conclusion
We have set out a model where measured ∆lnTFP falls due to (a) falls in underlying technical
progress (b) changes due to intangibles in underlying economic (spillovers, imperfect competition)
and measurement (capitalisation, share-adjustment) factors. Our main mechanisms are (a) if un-
measured intangible investment falls, then ∆lnTFP falls (b) if measured intangible investment falls,
∆lnTFP if there are spillovers and/or increasing returns (c) if unmeasured intangible investment
falls but measured GDP falls at a faster rate, then GDP growth is increasingly understated since
intangibles should have been capitalised as output.
Without fully-corrected TFP data, we estimate the relation between measured country ∆lnTFP
and proxies for these terms, measured by intangible shares from the pre-recession period and R&D
from the post-recession period. Using a 16 country dataset, we document (a) a slowdown in R&D
capital services growth and (b) an increasing diﬀerence between R&D investment growth and GDP
growth that worsens mismeasurement biasing GDP growth down. Our data show a slowdown
in ∆lnTFP of 1pppa between 2011-4 and 2000-7, and estimates of the model suggest declining
intangible capital services growth contributed 0.4pppa and value added mismeasurement 0.2pppa.
Finally, our estimates indicate a statistically and economically signiﬁcant common fall of around
0.4pppa in ∆lnTFP 2011-14, controlling for other things. Whether this is underlying technical
progress slowing down or other omitted factors is a matter for future work.
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Table A.1: R&D changes (unweighted averages of sample countries)
Period ∆lnLR&D ∆lnXR&D ∆XR&D/Y V NR&D/Y V ∆lnY N,R&D ∆lnY V ∆lnY V −∆lnY N,R&D (XGovR&D/Y V )
2000-7 4.545% 5.487% 0.231% 1.221% 5.154% 2.775% -2.364% 0.212%
2011-4 3.401% 3.287% 0.166% 1.404% 2.732% 0.616% -2.390% 0.210%
Source: Authors' calculations .
Appendix
A More details on R&D spend
To help understand the trends on R&D spend, Table A.1sets out data for 2000-07 and 2011-4 for
R&D related varables. As column 1 shows, the growth in R&D employment slowed from 4.5%pa to
3.4%pa. Column 2 shows a fall in the growth of R&D capital stock, from 5.4% to 3.3%, and column
3 likewise a fall in the ratio of changes in R&D capital to output. This is the correct variable to
infer returns to R&D if there is depreciation: as column 4 shows, the R&D spend to GDP ratio has
in fact risen slightly. Column 5 and 6 show the strong slowdown in both growth of real R&D and
growth of real GDP, enough so that the capitalisatino term, column 7, gets more negative (so that
meaured ∆lnTFP falls. Finally, column 8 shows a fall in Government R&D to GDP ratio.
B Note on Gap analysis
One popular model of international TFP is to relate ∆lnTFP to the gap of that country with the
frontier country, typically the US, with the idea that the larger the distance to the Frontier, the
greater the potential for growth. We do not have TFP level data so have instead used the OECD
PPP data on output per hour to measure the gap with the US as (US output per hour/country
output per hour). The data are set out in Figure B.1 which shows the data in both periods. In the
2000-07 period, there is a hint of a positive relation, if one excepts ITA, ESP and PRT: HUN and
CZE for example had large gaps with the US and fast ∆lnTFP . In the second period, any such
relation seems to have disappeared. The slowest ∆lnTFP in this period are in countries with the
largest gaps: CZE, HUN, PRT for example. It thus does not seem as if the gap with the US is an
important explanation over this period (it is insigniﬁcant when adding it to the regression).
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Figure B.1: ∆lnTFP and labour productivity gap with US
Source: Conference Board, Total Economy Database and OECD iLibrary
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